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TAXATION-EXCESS PROFITS-GENERAL RELIEF UNDER SECTION

I. R. C.-On August r9, r946 the Tax Court handed down its
decision in the case of East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. CofWm'is722
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sioner of Internal Revenue,1 involving the review of the commissioner's disallowance of the taxpayer's application for excess profits tax
relief under section 722 I. R. C., as amended. The taxpayer's claim
was based essentially on section 722 (b) ( 4), having to do with a change
in character of the business. The taxpayer was incorporated in May,
I935 and carried on a trucking business between Dallas, Texas and several cities on the borders of Texas until October, I938, at which time it
acquired a certificate of conv~nience and necessity to operate between
- Dallas and Fort Worth. In the same month the taxpayer obtained a
certificate to operate between Dallas ahd _Memphis, Tennessee, and in
December, I939 another, for operations between Memphis and St.
Louis, Missouri. These acquisitions in addition to enlarging the company's territory caused a significant change in operations. The operations from I935 through October, I938 involved the hauling of freight
to intermediate points, with trucks generally arriving at their destination empty: the cartage between Dallas and Fort Worth, Memphis,
and St. Louis involved haulins- full loads on through trips to destination. It was the taxpayer's contention that it takes two to three years to
develop such a system to the point of normal operation and consequently that the company's ave.rage base period net· income did not
properly reflect 'its net income. In a series of mathematical calculations,
aided by testimony of expert witnesses and the two year "push-back"
rule, the taxpayer demonstrated that its average base period net income
was too low and sought to prove that it should be increased by I 2 5 per
cent, on the basis of its changed operations. The court thought that the
nµ{l)ayer had proved that the tax levied was excessive and discriminatory and that it had established what would be a fair and just amount
representing normal earnings. The opinion of the judge who heard the
case was reviewed by the Special Division and relief was granted,
though not in the amount requested. 2 At this writing the taxpayer's
motion for reconsideration on the amount of relief granted is pending
before the court.
.
:This decision, already famous as the first case in which a taxpayer
has succeeded in obtaining relief under section 722 in the Tax Court,
presents an excellent opportunity to review the much discussed and
often maligned general relief provisions of the excess profits tax program in order to see what has developed since its inception in I 940.
1

7 T.C. 579 (1946).

2

As stated the taxpayer sought an increase of 125 per cent. This was on the basis

of testimony of three expert witnesses. One of them, the president of the taxpayer
corporation, estimated that in a period of two to three years the net earnings would be
225 per cent of the earnings for the calendar year 1939, and this was the figure used
as a basis for all computations. In granting the relief the court discarded the 225 per
cent and settled on 150 per cent, a 50 per cent increase.
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From the outset it was apparent that some form of relief had to be
made available to taxpayers who would su:ffer from the lack of flexibility found in any taxing statute of this type. This realization led to
the enactment of the first relief provisions as a part of the Second Revenue Act of I 940.8 Since we shall here deal with general relief rather
than with provisions related to specific hardship problems our attention
will be centered in the development of section -722.4
The content of section 722 of the I 940 act and the regulations applicable thereto proved to be practically worthless because they set up
no standards to guide the commissioner. 5 As a result the section was
rewritten by a I 94r amendment, 6 which provided the commissioner
with guiding principles to aid in administration. It was recognized,
however, that the content of the amendment left much to be desired,
and further study, analysis and revision were suggested. 7 As a result
the section was subjected to two more amendments 8 before it reached
its final form in December, r943. On November 2, r944 the Treasury
Department issued the now familiar bulletin on section 722 which was
to serve as a handbook for department personnel and as an indication of
the government's interpretation of that section for taxpayers. Thus the
law as amended through December, r943 together with the bulletin
and the current regulations 9 brings the general relief provisions up to
date; but the amendments, the bulletin, and the regulations have not
satisfied all of the interested taxpayers or their counsel, and numerous
objections and suggestions for improvement have been made.10 In the
light of the pattern formed by the decisions handed down by the Tax
Court one may wonder whether some of the objections may not have
been unfounded, particularly if relief is obtainable with the expenditure
8

Title II, Pub. L. 801, 54 Stat. L. 974 at 975 (1940).
The present title of § 722 is, "General Relief-Constructive Average Base Period
Net Income."
·
5
Sec. 722 (1940 act)-Adjustment of Abnormalities in Income and Capital by
the Commissioner, which reads as follows: "For the purpose of this subchapter, the
Commissioner shall also have authority to make such adjustments as may be necessary
to adjust abnormalities affecting income or capital, and his decisions shall be subject
to review by the United States Board of Tax Appeals." U. S. TREAS. REG. 109,
§ 30.722-1, 1943 INT. REV. BuLL. 761.
6
Pub. L. 10, § 6, 55 Stat. L. 17 at 23 (1941).
7
See for example, Magill, "Relief from Excess Profits Tax," 89 UNiv. PA. L.
REv. 843 (1941).
·
8
Pub. L. 753, § 222, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 914 (1942); Pub. L. 20°1, 57 Stat. L.
4

601 (1943).
TREAs. REG. n2, Excess Profits Tax, §§ 35.722-1-5;
2 MoNTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES oN CoRPORATioNs 1945-46, p. 530; Groseclose, "Expanding Business and the Excess Profits Tax," l 8 TEMPLE L. Q. 504
(1944), digested in 23 TAXES 448 (1945); Eppston, "Excess Profits Tax ReliefFrustration or Promise?" 69 N.J. L. J. 3 (1946).
9

10
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of no more than a reasonable effort. What then must a taxpayer do to
obtain relief under section 722 as it stands today? ,
,
The problem presented may be divided into three parts: What must
be proved; what .materials can and should be used in proving it; and
what procedure must be followed. The answer to the first question is
found in section 722 (a) and can best l;ie explained by quoting excerpts
therefrom. The taxpayer must establish "that the tax computed under
this subchapter ( without benefit of this section) results in an excessive
and discriminatory tax and [he must establish] what would be a fair
and just amount representing norrrial earnings to be used as a constructive average base period net income." To establish that the tax
is excessive and discriminatory a domestic corporation organized before
January 1, 1940 11 will seek to prove that the actual average base period
net income or the invested capital credit is not an adequate standard
because of the existence of one of the conditions set out in section 722
'(b) ( 1-5),12 whereas domestic corporations organized subsequent to
December 31, 1939 must make their case under section 722(c)(1-3).18
That proof of the first element does not automatically establish the
second, i.e., what would be a fair and just average base period net income, is obvious. This second element is considered in a subsequent
- paragraph. There is, however, an additional problem regarding what
must be proved. Acting on GCM 24013 14 the commissioner contended
that a third factor must be proved, namely the inadequacy of the actual
average base period net income as a standard of normal earnings. This
construction· of the statute has been severely criticized,15 and it appears
from the wording of the opinion in the East Texas case16 that the Tax
Court has rejected the commissioner's view.17 Therefore it may be as11
Whether a foreign corporation must use § 722(c) or may use § 722(b) is
determined by I.R.C., § 712(b).
12
lt has been argued with considerable force that § 722(c) relief should be
available to domestic corporations organized before January 1, 1940. See Crampton,
"Excess Profits Tax Relief for Pre-194o_Corporations," 24 TAXES 231 (1946).
18
See note 11, supra.
14
G.C.M. 24013, 1943 INT. REV. BULL. 794.
15
2 MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON CORPORATIONS 1945-46, p. 532; Cf.
Landman, "The General Counsel's Section 722 Memorandum," 23 TAXES 63 (1945).
16 The court in the second paragraph of the opinion stated: "Under the statute
petitioner must establish ( l) that the tax computed without the benefit of section 722
results in an excessive and discriminatory tax and (2) a fair and just amount representing normal earnings to be used as a constructive average base period net income."
7 T.C. 579 at 587 (1946).
17 In the Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
7 T.C. 1325 at 1331 (1946), the court appears to state the conclusion conversely. It
said, "If an inadequate standard for the base period is so proved, thereupon the excess
profits tax •.. shall be considered excessive and discriminatory," citing East Texas Motor
Freight Lines. Hence it is clear that proof of,either factor is proof of the other.

1947

J

COMMENTS

sumed that only the two elements set out above need be proved to
obtain relief.
··
Counsel in gathering material to prove a case under section 722
must keep two matters in mind. The first is whether or not relief will
actually be obtained by resort to section 722, even if a case is proved
thereunder. This is to say that any factual situation should be tested
against a check list to see if all other avenues of relief have been explored. Thus the actual excess profit credit used should be tested to see,
in the case of a corporation using the average income basis, whether by
use of the invested capital basis a gr~ater increase in the credit might
not be obtained than could be hoped for by applying for relief under
section 722; and vice versa in the case of an invested capital basis corporation, if it is in the position to use the average income basis.18 The
same point applies regarding the possible application of the 80 per cent
ceiling provision of section 7 ro( a) ( 1) (B), the "deficit rule" provisions
of section 7 I 3 ( e) ( l), and the "normal growth" provisions of section
713(£). It should also be noted that the commissioner has claimed the
power to eliminate abnormal income in the base period under section
722 (a). This means that a taxpayer seeking to construct an. average
base period net income may not be able to use such items of income in
the construction because they were abnormal, with the result that the
constructed base may be less than the actual base which included the abnormal items.19
A second consideration is that various sections of the statute cannot be combined in building a constructive average base period net income. This was pointed out by the court in the recent case of Sti4nson
Mill Co. v. Conunissioner of Internal Reveooe 20 in which the petitioner attempted under section 722 (b) ( 1) to increase its net income for
1937 (the condition being a strike which curtailed its operations) and
then attempted to use the average of the actual 1936, the newly constructed 1937, and the actual 1939 incomes as a basis for applying the
75 per cent provision of ~ection 713(e)(1) to 1938, the lowest income
year of the base period. The court interpreted the statute to mean that
I.R.C., § 712(a).
For a detailed listing of all possible methods of reducing excess profits taxation
see: Simons and Seghers, "Relief from Excess Profits Tax Burdens with Special Reference to Section 722," 21 TAXES 67 at 68 (1943).
20
7 T.C. rn65 (1946). The REGULATIONS, § 35.722-2(6) and the BULLETIN,
Part VIII, U(E) (1) have maintained this position in regard to§ 713(e) (1) from the
outset contrary to the views of several writers: See T.trleau, "Currently Controversial Aspects of Section 722," I TAX L. REV. 197 at 208 (1946); and Maloney, "Special Relief Under the Excess Profits Tax--Section 722," CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL
TAXATION, (American Bar Assn. Section of Taxation, Practicing Law Institute) p. 41
(1946). It appears that the case has modified even the Bulletin's position in regard to
sec. 713(£), see TREAS. BuLL., Part VIII, U(E) (2).
18
19
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the petitioner could use either of the methods to construct a base but
could not combine them. 21 The court has affirmed" this position in the
case of The Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue 22 where the taxpayer attempted to combine section 722 and
section 713(f) to obtain a constructiye average base period net income.
With the above considerations in mind the taxpayer is ready to
gather material for obtaining relief. Rather than enumerating a myriad
of details regarding the type of material that must be amassed to implement each individual application 23 it is sufficient to point out the
principles which must be borne in mi_nd in marshalling the proof.
Any attempt to claim that the tax as levied is excessive and discriminatory must take certain factors in~o consideration. The ultimate
test applicable to claims under all of these subsections is whether the
event or condition relied· on caused a reduction in net profits.24 If it had
no effect on the net profits, proof of such an event or condition is worthless. 25 A claim based on section 722 (b) (I) must grow out of the happening of some physical event. The event need not occur in the tax21

"Section 722 provides that the constructive average base period net income,
constructed under that Section shall, in the determination of the tax, be used 'in lieu of
the average base period net income otherwise determined under this subchapter.' •••
We consider it inescapable that the average constructed under' section 722 must take
the place of any average elsewhere determined in the same subchapter.'' 7 T.C. 1065
at 1073 (1946).
22
7 T.C. 1325 (1946).
23
See the following for listings of materials and ideas applicable to various special
situations: TREAS. BuLL. ON SECTION 722 (1944); BICKFORD, ExcEss PROFITS TAX
RELIEF (1945); HOFFMAN, PRACTICAL PROCEDURES IN CLAIMING EXCESS PROFITS
TAX RELIEF (1945); 2 MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON CORPORATIONS 1945-46,
p. 532 et seq.; Miller, "Relief Provisions of the New Excess Profits Tax Act," 21
TAXES 195 (1943); Polk, "Excess Profits Tax Relief," 21 TAXEs-432 (1943); Bock,
"Possibilities for Excess Profits Tax Relief," 21 TAXES 443 (1943); Seidman, "Excess
Profits Tax Relief in 'Variant Profits Cycle' Cases," 21 TAXES 422 (1943); Seghers,
"Relief Under-Excess .Profits Tax Law," 22 TAXES 275 (1944); Kopple, "Suggested
Methods in the App1ication for Sec. 722 Relief," 22 TAXES 308 (1944); Mills, "The·
Brewing Industry and Section 722," 22 TAXES 444 (1944); Seidman, "The Treasury's
Bulletin on Section 722 Relief," 22 TAXES 194 ( 1945); Groseclose, "Expanding
Business and the Excess Profits Tax," 18 TEMPLE L. Q. 504 (1944); Seidman, "Case
Histories of Some Section 722 Settled Claims,"· 24 TAXES 2 (1946); Diamond, "Problems of Proof and Procedure Under Section 722," 24 TAXES 579 (1946); Simons and
Shultz, "The Missing Link in Relief Cases," 24 TAXES 803 ( l 946) ; Simons and
Seghers, "Relief from Excess Profits Tax Burdens, with Special Reference to Section
722," 21 TAXES 67 (1943); See also, Miller, "Section 722, A Case Study," N.Y.
UNIV. FouRTH ANNNUAL lNsT. ON FED. TAX. 899 et seq. (1946).
24
·
The Fish Net and Twine Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 8
T.C. No. IO (1947), is an example of a case where a taxpayer failed to show that its
low earnings or operating losses were due to the economic conditions alleged to exist.
25
See for example the discussion in the TREAS. BULL. oN SECTION 722, Part
II(A) (1944) of the effect of t_he 1937 strike in the Appalachian coal fields.
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payer's own business, but it must be unusual and peculiar, it must happen during or immediately prior to the base period, and it must interrupt or diminish the corporation's normal production, output or operation. Typical examples usually cited are fires, floods, and strikes. 26
Contrasted with a claim under section 722 (b) (I), a claiµi under
section 722(b) (2) is grounded on economic conditions rather than the
happening of a physical event. There must be proof that the economic
condition is both temporary and unusual for the taxpayer or the industry. 21 In proving an industry-wide condition one must take cognizance
of the difficulty often present in proving that the taxpayer is a member
of the particular industry. A typical example of a temporary economic
condition is a price war, 28 and an example of what the bureau considers
to be an unjustifiable condition is a drop in net profits due to errors in
managerial judgment. 29
Claims under section 722 (b) (3) rest upon variant profit cycles or
sporadic profit experiences affecting the taxpayer's industry as a whole
rather than the taxpayer alone. Consequently one is again faced with
the problem of proving that the taxpayer is a member of a particular
industry. Variant profit cycles are generally proved by comparing
charts of the industry's profit cycle with those of business generally}10
The point of contrast between section 722 (b) (I, 2) and (b) (3) is that
(b) (I, 2) are founded on abnormalities in the base period while under
(b) (3) the conditions in the base period may be normal for the industry but the industry's profit cycle does not coincide with that of business
in general.
Under section 722 (b) ( 4) the claim is based upon a change in the
character of the business, or the commencement of the business immediately prior to or during the base period. It appears that this is the
ground most often alleged in seeking relief,81 and it has presented
some of the most serious difficulties. The difficulties are related to
' proof of commencement of business or commitment to a course of ac26

Seidman, "Case Histories of Some Section 722 Settled Claims," 24 TAXES 2 at
4 (1946); 4 P-H FED. TAX SERV., 1f 48, 128 (1946).
27
8 !I'.C. No. IO, at p. 8 (1947). The court in that case stated, "the next
burden of the petitioner would be to show that the alleged price war or competition •••
was a temporary economic event unusual in the case of this taxpayer or in the case of the
industry as a whole."
28
Seidman, "Case Histories of Some Section 722 Settled Claims," 24 TAXES
2 at 6 (1946).
29
TREAS. BuLL. ON SECTION 722, Part III(A) (1944).
80
Seidman, "Case Histories of Some Section 722 Settled Claims," 24 TAXES
2 at 8 (1946).
81
Miller, "Section 722 Cases Now Pending Before the Tax Court," N. Y. UN1v.
FOURTH ANNUAL INST. ON FED. TAX. 874 (1946).
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tion before January I, I 940,32 and what constitutes a change in character of the business. The bureau's position is that commencing business
must amount to something more than mere inc9rporation,88 and to be
committed to a course of action the taxpayer must have taken such definite action to •effect a change within a reasonably definite time that it
cannot withdraw without incurring a substantial loss.3 The statute lists
certain activities which are included within the term "change in the
character of business" and the bulletin 35 serves as a guide in delimiting
the scope of the activities.36
Section 722 (b) (5), aptly labeled the "catch-all" provision, allows
claims based on "any other factor" which is relevant, and there has
been considerable controversy regarding the merit of attempting to
prove a claim under it. ·The bulletin seeks to. keep the application of
(b) (5) within narrow bounds,3 7 but certain writers relying upon the
House and Senate Committee reports have spelled out certain hypothetical situations in which (b) (5) should be applicable.311
The corporations seeking to claim under section 722(c) 39 will attempt to prove one of three things: that they engage in a business
where intangible assets which are not included in invested capital play
an important part in production of income, or that capital does not play
an important part in the production of income, or that their invested
capital is abnormally low. Again the bulletin sets up standards which
the bureau considers must be met 40 and again the bulletin is critized.41
Once the tax as levied has been proved excessive and discriminatory, whether under section 722(b) or (c), there remains the problem
of constructing an average base period net income ,under section 722
(a). The statute sets out only the general requirements which must be
met, i.e., it must "be a fair and just amount representing normal earnings," and leaves. the taxpayer without any rules to guide him in construction. Consequently the taxpayer is generally faced with one of
three problems in attempting to construct the base. They are: What
4,

82

See§ 722(b) (4) for certain acquisitions which, if made prior to May 31, 1941,
88
TREAS. BuLL. oN SECTION 722, Part V(I)(B) (1944).
114 Id., Part V(C).
85
Ibid.
38 For criticism of the Bulletin's position see: Tarleau, "Currently Controversial
Aspects of Section 722," I TAX L. REV. 197 at 202 (1946).
117
TREAS. BULL. ON SECTION 722, Part VI (1944).
88 Maloney and Wood, ''.The Treasury Department's Bulletin on Section 722,"
23 TAXES 39 (1945).
119
Domestic corporations organized subsequent to December 3 1, 1.93 9 and certain
foreign corporations; see I.R.C., § 712(b).
40
TREAS. BuLL. oN SECTION 722, Part VII (1944).
41 Evans, "Section 722(c)," N.Y. UNIV. FouRTH ANNUAL INST. ON,FED. TA!x:.
971 (1946).

will be considered as made on December 31, 1939.
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is normal income? What is the effect of-the sentence found in section
722 (a) which prevents one from making use of events occurring after
December 3r, r939? What is. the connection between the push-back
rule and the commitment rule in section 722(b)(4), if any? The conflict on the subject of normal income has raged chiefly around commitments which were made prior to December 3r, r939 for the purpose of
filling orders which were in some way affected by or connected with
the war in Europe. Such commitments of course invoke the push-back
rule of section 722 (b) ( 4) which allows the construction of the base to
be set back two years. When the problem of determining what factors
are to be used in constructing the new base is presented, the government
by reference to GCM 24or3 42 contends that any commitment which in
any way hinges on the war is a reflection of an .abnormal condition and
cannot be employed in constructing the base period net income. The
government's position has been contested 48 and though there has been
one decision handed down on the problem by the Tax Court 44 the
opinion has done little to clarify the condition 45 because the factual
situation in that case was so unusual.
The limitation on use of events occurring subsequent to December
3r, r939 has provoked the phrase "peeping behind the curtain." The
purpose of the limitation is to prevent the use of events which are at
least in part affected by the impact of war on our economy. When this
problem is met it can be surmounted in one of several ways. An example of one method which may be used is the hypothetical questionexpert witness system followed with great success in the East Texas
case. In that case expert witnesses were asked hypothetical questions
which carefully omitted reference to elements known to have resulted
from actual experience after December 3r, r939. Counsel should,
however, be cautioned to be prepared with post-r939 data to justify the
taxpayer's contentions since in the case of Monarch Cap Screw &
Manufacturing Co. 46 post-r939 data was used to show that prices in
the base period were not depressed. 47 • In addition it should be noted
that there is an exception to the rule regarding "peeping behind the
curtain"; found in section 722 (a) and the last sentence of section 722
(b) ( 4). In order to fall within the exception a corporation must make
a commitment before January 1, r 940 resulting in a consumation after
December 31, 1939, or make certain acquisitions from certain competiG.C.M. 24013, 1943 INT. REV. BuLL. 794.
2 MoNTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXEs ON CoR,PoRAnoNs, 1945-46, p. 555.
44
Fezandie & Sperrle, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 T.C. II85
(1945).
'
45
Simons, "The Fezandie Case," 24 TAXES 68 (1946).
46 The Monarch Cap Screw & Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 5 T.C. 1220 (1946).
47 Simons, "Two Recent 722 Developments," 24 TAXES 254 (1946).
42
48
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tors before May 31, 1941. The second case in which a taxpayer succeeded in obtaining relief under section 722 in the Tax Court was 7-Up
Fort Worth Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 48
involving the application of this exception to the "peeping" rule. It
throws considerable light on the Tax Court's use of post-1939 data in
the construction of a new average base period net income.
- The problem of the connection between the push-back and the commitment rules under section 722(b)(4) has come about solely as a result of the Treasury's interpretation of the statute and as yet has not
been settled by a Tax Court decision. Briefly stated, the commissioner
contends that in any case where there has been a change which invokes
the push-back rule the constructive base will be limited to the productive capacity to which the taxpayer was committed as of December 31,
1939. Thus if under the push-back rule the taxpayer could show that by
the end of 193 9 it could have sold 5000 units of a new commodity and its
production capacity, actual or committed, as of that time was only 3000
units, the commissioner will seek to limit the constructive base to a
3000 unit basis. It is questionable whether this is a sound construction
of the statute and well-reasoned objections have been voiced thereto.49
The actual material to be used in establishing what is a fair and just
amount representing normal earnings will vary with every application.
Generally under section 722 (b) ( 1) and ( 2) earnings records in some
una:ffected period will be the chief evidence used, whereas under
(b) (3) it will be statistical data showing cyclical variations from the
profit cycle of business in general. Under (b)(4) the evidence varies
greatly depending on the cha:nge in character, from the use of forecasts
that may have been drawn up by the corporation officials before December 31, 1939 to the use of expert witnesses and hypothetical questions.
Respecting section 722 ( c) no more can be said than that some writers
express pessimism regarding availability of materials to establish an
average base period net income if the corporation was organized after
December 31, 1939.50
Under the heading of procedure the taxpayer is confronted with
the practical problems of :filing claims and submission of proof. Except
in the case of a taxpayer who has an adjusted excess profits tax net in8 T.C. No. 6 (1947).
Tarleau, "Currently Controversial Aspects of Section 722," I TAX L. REV.
197 at 205 (1946). 2 MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON CORPORATIONS, 1945-46,
p. 552. Maloney, "Special Relief Under the Excess Profits Tax--Section 722," CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAXATION (American Bar Assn. Section of Taxation,
Practicing Law Institute) p. 40 ( I 946).
50
Maloney, "Special R~lief Under the Excess Profits Tax--Section 722," CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAXATION (American Bar Assn. Section of Taxation,
Practicing Law Institute) p. 48 (1946). Cf. Seidman, "Case Histories of Some Section
722 Settled Claims," 24 TAXES 2 at 15 ( I 946 )'.
48
49

1947]

CoMMENTS

773

come in excess of 50 per cent of the normal tax net income 51 any taxpayer seeking section 722 relief must pay the tax as levied and file a
separate Form 991 Application for Relief 52 with the commissioner
within the time prescribed by section 322 I. R. C. for each year in
which relief is sought. 53 The application is considered a claim for refund 5& and may be amended within the time allowed for filing the
original claim, or withdrawn and a new claim filed if no substantial
action has been taken by the commissioner. 55 Once the application is
filed it goes into the hands of the Excess Profits Tax Council, a body
set up in the bureau for the exclusive purpose of dealing with section
722 claims. 56 If the council disallows the claim in whole or in part it
must send a notice of disallowance to the taxpayer in accordance with
section 732(a) I.R.C. and this nobce also serves as a notice of deficiency
if one exists as a result of the council's decision. Under the same code
section the taxpayer is then given a period of ninety days in which to
file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the tax.
The procedural problems that have presented the greatest difficulty
relate to the questions of when the Tax Court will review the council's
determination and the scope of the review. The court has stated in the
Uni-Term Stevedoring Co. case 57 that it would not consider a petition
which seeks relief under section 722 unless the government has acted
on a form 99 I application and mailed a notice of disallowance under
section 732. This position was reaffirmed in the Pioneer Parachute Co.
case.5s
.
There has been considerable speculation as to the scope of the
court's review, and the limits are not yet precisely defined. However,
the East Texas decision has resulted in considerable clarification. Some
confusion arose as a result of the decision in the Blum Folding Paper
Box case 119 where the court said: "This means that the applications must
set forth not only the grounds for relief, but also a statement of the
facts which the Commissioner is to consider in support of the reasons
given .... The taxpayer may not, as here, file a superficial claim, leavSuch a taxpayer may proceed under I.R.C., § 710(a) (5).
Sec. 722(d) I.R.C. requires that the claim follow the Regulations, hence one
must file on Form 991 as prescribed.
53
TREAS. REG., § 35.722-5(d) requires a separate application for each year.
uTREAS. REG.,§ 35.722-5(c).
55
TREAS, REG.,§ 35.722-5(a).
56
Bierman, "A New Deal Under Section 722," 24 TAXES 988 (1946).
57
Uni-Term Stevedoripg Co., Inc. v, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 T.C.
917 (1944).
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ing the Commissioner in ignorance of the possible factual support for
the claim, and then, after the resulting disallowance, come forward for
the first time with the supporting statement of facts." 60 It was felt by
many that this, along with certain changes in the rules of the Tax
Court, meant that everything-grounds for relief, facts, arid evidence
-had to be submitted to the council and that nothing new could be
introduced before the court.6 1. But in its rulings during the trial of the
East Texas case the court stated that the Blum case stands for the
proposition that there must be a full disclosure of the factual basis of
the claim before the council, but that this does not limit the evidence
later submitted to the court.62
The decision on the merits by the division of the Tax Court hearing
the petition is reviewed by the special division set up under section 732
( d) for the specific purpose of reviewing cases arising under. section
72r(a)(2)(C) and sectjon 722. The Tax Court's final decision as evidenced by the special division's determination i~ not subject to judicial
review under the statute.68
,
It may be concluded that there was justification for the criticism of
the general relief provisions of the excess profits tax law at its inception
and during its early development, but as of the date of this writing the
establishment of the Excess Profits Tax Council, the clarification of
regulations, and the decisions, of the Tax Court cited herein all make
for a workable though difficult general relief program. As one author
has put it, these claims "mean just plain hard work." 64

John W. Riehm, Jr., S.Ed.
4 T.C. 795 at 799 (1945).
See a letter addressed to the Hon, Bolon B. Turner, Presiding Judge, Tax Court
of the United States from John E. McClure, quoted in 4 P-H FED. TAX SER.v..
1f 48,213 (1946). Cf. BICKFORD, EXCESS PROFITS TAX RELIEF 285 (1945).
62 4 P-H FED. TAX SER.V. 1f 48, 133K (1946).
68 I.R.C., § 732(c).
•
64 BICKFORD, EXCESS PROFITS TAX RELIEF 271 (1945).
60
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